Exhibit A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

SCANSOFT, INC.,

Plaintiff

-VS
VOICE SIGNAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

LAURENCE S. GILLICK, ROBERT S. ROTH,

)

OA No. 04-10353-PBS

Pages 1 - 28

JONATHAN P. YAMRON, and
MANFRED G. GRABHERR,

Defendants

MOTION HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE PATTI B. SARIS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

United States District Court 1 Courthouse Way, Courtroom 19 Boston, Massachusetts December 12, 2005, 3:15 p.m.

LEE A. MARZILLI
CERTIFIED REALTIME REPORTER
United States District Court
1 Courthouse Way, Room 3205
Boston, MA 02210
(617)345-6787

APPEARANCES:

ERIK PAUL BELT, ESQ. and LISA M. FLEMING, ESQ., Bromberg & Sunstein, 125 Summer Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02110-1618, for the Plaintiff.

KENNETH A. COHEN, ESQ., J. ANTHONY DOWNS, ESQ., and PAUL F. WARE, ESQ., Goodwin Procter, LLP, Exchange Place, 53 State Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02109, for the Plaintiff.

DOUGLAS J. KLINE, ESQ., Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP, 125 High Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02109, for the Plaintiff.

ROBERT S. FRANK, JR., ESQ. and SARAH CHAPIN COLUMBIA, ESQ., Choate, Hall & Stewart, Two International Place, Boston, Massachusetts, 02110, for the Defendants.

PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: The case of ScanSoft, Incorporated V. Voice Signal Technologies, et al, Civil Action No. 04-10353, will now be heard before this Court. Will counsel please identify themselves for the record.

MR. COHEN: Kenneth Cohen from Goodwin Procter representing ScanSoft.

MR. KLINE: Doug Kline of Testa Hurwitz representing ScanSoft.

MR. FRANK: Robert Frank and Sarah Columbia representing the defendant, Voice Signal Technologies.

MR. BELT: Eric Belt. I also have Lisa Fleming here from Bromberg & Sunstein for ScanSoft.

THE COURT: We're here on our motion to disqualify?

MR. FRANK: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you want to be heard?

MR. FRANK: Yes, thank you. I bring this motion with no particular relish. In the week that I engaged in conversation with Goodwin Procter about this, I cleared another conflict involving another case before your Honor, and I met with Mr. Cohen before this started to lay out the facts in the hope that this could be avoided.

The question for your Honor is whether Goodwin

Procter will be permitted to become the second counsel in

this case for ScanSoft. There is no suggestion that prior counsel are not willing, able, and very competent to proceed. There's no suggestion of delay or disruption. The issue was raised promptly after Goodwin filed a notice of appearance. The question is whether the conversations between Voice Signal Technologies, the defendants, and Goodwin Procter established an attorney-client relationship between Voice Signal and Goodwin Procter.

It is undisputed that Voice Signal had preliminary conversations with Goodwin Procter at the outset of this case, that the law firm met with Voice Signal on two separate occasions for a period of several hours, and that after each of those meetings, there were e-mail and telephone communications. It's agreed that the first meeting was more general in character, and the second meeting was more specific in character.

After the first meeting there was an extended exchange of E-mails --

MR. FRANK: You do not, you do not have any of them, although I am quite prepared to provide them to the Court if you --

THE COURT: Do I have all those E-mails?

THE COURT: Because one of the things that's striking me as very difficult about this case is whether I can address the motion to disqualify based on this very

contentious paper record -- "Yes I did. No, I didn't. I don't remember this. Yes, I did" -- or whether I need to refer this to either a master or a magistrate judge to make fact findings.

MR. FRANK: Well, let me say this: What I hope to do this afternoon is to try to confine my argument to that which is essentially undisputed. And let me concede that there are a number of facts which are in dispute, and it may be that you will choose at the end of this to do that, but let me point out what is undisputed, and then you can decide. The first of these meetings was on February 26, 2004. After that meeting, Paul Ware of Goodwin Procter e-mailed the president of Voice Signal saying, "Dan, We would like to have a follow-up and discuss some things that we are thinking. We could also do some more digging over the weekend," and then there's some discussion about when they might get together.

Thereafter -- that occurred at 10:44 in the morning on February 27 -- at 12:01 that day, Mr. Downs of Goodwin Procter sent an E-mail to Mr. Roth, the president of Voice Signal, in which he said, "In advance of our get-together, is there any information you can fax or e-mail to us concerning, for example --" a particular subject matter and particular documents that were executed in connection with that subject matter? And one of the things that I'm

conscious of here, your Honor, is not waiving the attorney-client privilege.

THE COURT: Yes. And to boot, some of this information, if I become a fact-finder in any way -- as I was reading this, I was struck with the fact Goodwin Procter has attacked your affidavit as being too general. I was trying to figure out a solution for that because in some ways, if you disclose it, you're disclosing the heart of the matter. On the other hand, how do they respond without the specifics? And I was thinking that it might make sense to have either a magistrate judge or a master who has no vested stake in the matter, you know, someone who won't be trying it, sit and parse through it all.

MR. FRANK: Let me say this. In <u>Bays V. Theran</u>, which is the central Massachusetts law case, the judge disqualified counsel based upon a description of the subject matters that were discussed as distinguished from the specifics of those discussions. And I'm perfectly prepared to describe those subject matters, and indeed I'm prepared to go further, as long as there's not going to be some claim of privilege waiver that follows from my having disclosed --

THE COURT: I tell you what. I won't interrupt.

You say what you have to say. I'll let opposing -- just know in the back of my mind is the concern about whether I need a fact-finding, because it's heavily disputed what was said and

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what wasn't said and how much of it was advice versus public information and that sort of thing. So you go do your thing, but just keep that in the back of your mind.

MR. FRANK: So this is at noon on Friday,

February 27. "In advance of our get-together --" this is

Goodwin Procter to Voice Signal -- "is there any information

that you can fax or e-mail to us concerning, for example, the

prior litigation between Voice Signal and Lernout & Hauspie

and releases that were executed or the filing made by

ScanSoft in an effort to avoid the effect of your earlier

settlement (and any decision on that filing)? I'd be happy

to review whatever you have handy, even if it's partial."

At 1:04 Mr. Roth responded with a description of certain events in connection with the prior litigation, which events would not have been known to ScanSoft or some of which events would not have been known to ScanSoft and some of which would have been known to ScanSoft. It's a description generically of events that occurred in the prior litigation between Voice Signal on the one hand and Lernout on the other hand and ScanSoft's efforts to intervene in that litigation at a prior point in time.

At 12:47 that same day, Mr. Roth sent certain documents to Goodwin Procter, which were a settlement agreement and certain releases, nonpublic documents that were given to Goodwin Procter in response to Mr. Downs's request

for further factual information. Later that afternoon at 5:06, Mr. Roth sent four separate court papers relating to the prior lawsuit. At 7:05 that evening, Mr. Downs of Goodwin Procter sent an E-mail to Mr. Roth which he marked "privileged" in which he said, "After a brief search, here is some potentially helpful prior art, none of which is cited in the patent."

Thereafter the parties met for an extended period on February 1, and the following, I think, can be distilled from the conflicting affidavits: First, there was a discussion of prior art and its relationship to the patent in suit in this case. Everyone agrees that there was discussion of the prior art that Goodwin Procter had dug up for Voice Signal and provided to Voice Signal. The point of dispute is whether there was also a discussion that day of prior art that Voice Signal had dug up and which it says it disclosed to Goodwin Procter and which Mr. Downs says he has no memory of seeing.

Second, Voice Signal says that it discussed ways in which the design of its product might be changed so as to move it further away from the claims of the patent.

Mr. Downs's responsive affidavit says that the question of whether there was an easy design-around is something that a patent lawyer would almost certainly ask, Paragraph 16 of his affidavit, but that he did not specifically recall any

discussion of design-arounds.

Third, in his affidavit, Mr. Roth says there was a subject of pricing, of damage exposure, of the effect that the mere bringing of the case was having on Voice Signal and about VoiceSignal's early discussions of settlement.

Mr. Downs says in his affidavit that he sees in his affidavit a reference to one chip per phone, a number that he believes is a price number, and the names of certain customers.

Fourth, Voice Signal sent information to Goodwin Procter, it's undisputed, about the prior litigation. Some of it was client work, or at least VoiceSignal's narrative description of things that had happened. Some of it were documents that were not in the public record and not available to ScanSoft, and some of it were documents that were in the public record and could with effort have been obtained. There is, I think, no -- they were requested by Goodwin Procter and provided, and it is a fair inference that they were thereafter discussed at the meeting on March 1 between Goodwin Procter on the one hand and Voice Signal, just as it is a fair inference that if Goodwin Procter supplied prior art for the purpose, that there was a discussion of that prior art and of its relationship to the patents.

Fifth, it is undisputed that after the second meeting, Mr. Roth sent an E-mail to Goodwin Procter in which

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he sought advice with respect to the advisability of putting the relevant patent into reissue and stated two separate potential tactical reasons why that might be a good idea. His affidavit states that Mr. Downs responded to his inquiry about the wisdom of doing such a thing and that they discussed the pros and cons of a reexamination proceeding. Mr. Downs's affidavit says that he does not recall coming to a conclusion, but there's no dispute that those two possible benefits of a reexamination proceeding were discussed. And it's undisputed that Goodwin Procter marked its E-mails or certain of its E-mails to Voice Signal as "privileged," and there is no explanation for why those E-mails would have been marked as "privileged" if Goodwin Procter did not believe that there either was then an attorney-client relationship, or that if they were later retained, it could be asserted that there was then an attorney-client relationship.

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Now, the test is set forth in <u>Bays V. Theran</u>, and that involved a situation in which the --

THE COURT: I know the case.

MR. FRANK: Okay, two or three telephone conversations each for less time. And the Court said that the facts found by the judge that the client communicated with the lawyer by mail and telephone with a view to possibly retaining him, that the client discussed with the lawyer various aspects of a potential suit, and that the lawyer

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counseled the client concerning some of the basic legal considerations involved in the suit, those facts warranted the judge's conclusion that an attorney-client relationship had been formed because -- and those facts are awfully close to these facts.

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The thing that had not been decided at the time of the Bays case was whether the court would require, require a disclosure, a proof of disclosure of confidential information, or whether all that it would require is the existence of a substantial relationship between the consultation on the one hand and the lawsuit in which the lawyer or that law firm wished to represent the other side after that in the same case. And after Bays, the Supreme Judicial Court adopted Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which expressly adopts the substantial relationship test, and which applies if there's a substantial relationship between the prior representation and this representation, undisputed here because it's the same case, and if the parties are adverse to one another, undisputed because this is the same case, and they're simply switching from one side to the other.

The rest of the response essentially is that -- and Bays says that if the substantial relationship test applies, later adopted by rule, "A subsequent representation is prescribed on the sole ground that the later suit, simply

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because of its substantial relation to the former one, exposes the attorney to an intolerably strong temptation to breach his duty of confidentiality to the former client. The former client need never prove that the attorney actually misused the confidences to the client's disadvantage." Now, the Goodwin Procter response is on two or three levels, and I'll just talk about one or two of them, and that will be enough. One is that Mr. Downs states that he does not remember the details of his communications with Voice Signal. And I respectfully suggest two things with respect to that: One, that can't be the test. I don't question Mr. Downs's integrity, but I do say that if the test is merely that a lawyer comes in and says that he does not remember the details of the conversation, that that leaves the door wide open for unscrupulousness. More to the point, if Mr. Downs is anything like me, once he gets up to his armpits in this case, he will remember things about that conversation or he may remember things about that conversation --To your knowledge, are Mr. Ware and THE COURT: Mr. Downs involved in the case right now, or has that been put on hold? I know that it's proposed that Mr. Ware MR. FRANK: be lead counsel. In fairness, I should say that it is said

that Mr. Downs will not be participating in the case.

Bays case, the lawyer requested was simply another lawyer in the same law firm. Mr. Ware, who was involved in both of the communications with Voice Signal, has put in an affidavit in which he acknowledges that there were promises of confidentiality made, but says that his memory of the conversations is very limited. I simply make the point that it is, accepting the truth of that -- and I have no basis for challenging it, just as I could not challenge it in any other case -- accepting the truth of that, the chances that his memory will be jogged by extended exposure to the facts are something that cannot otherwise be valued.

THE COURT: Would it cure your problem as a

THE COURT: Would it cure your problem as a practical matter if we carved Mr. Ware and Mr. Downs out of this case with a Chinese wall?

MR. FRANK: No. First, I think, as a legal matter, that is not the question. There's a case called --

THE COURT: Well, you may be right as a legal matter, but I'm just talking about as a pragmatic basis, if you took the two of them out of it and you had Mr. Kline or someone else who had no involvement with Voice --

MR. FRANK: The answer is obviously, as a practical matter, that reduces the risk. But to be weighed against that is the fact that ScanSoft already has very good counsel, that there are any number of lawyers in the world who could be retained as second counsel who are just as competent as

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the very competent lawyers at Goodwin Procter.
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               THE COURT: Well, can I ask you this? Has this
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     dispute essentially put this whole litigation on hold?
              MR. FRANK: No, but it hasn't helped any.
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               THE COURT: Well, who's been moving it along,
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    Mr. Bromberg?
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              MR. FRANK: Bromberg & Sunstein. We've been
    negotiating -- for example, we will be presenting to you very
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     shortly -- my firm is stuck in a dispute with Bromberg &
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     Sunstein about the procedures for the court-appointed expert
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     which we're going to --
               THE COURT: Because I don't want to put the whole
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     thing on hold. I mean, Goodwin should just be sort of
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     sidelined while the rest of the case is going forward.
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               MR. FRANK: Absolutely, and it is going forward.
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               THE COURT: And you have a claim on your claim
     construction at some point that I've never really gotten
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     resolved, right?
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              MR. FRANK: That is correct, although, again, just
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     to remind you of how you got to where you are, we got to the
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     argument about claim construction and --
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                          I got annoyed because there were so
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               THE COURT:
     many different terms that you raised, just like a phone book
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     full. But I still need to address that, right?
               MR. FRANK: I'm sure your Honor -- what your Honor
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1 said was that it was not possible to tell at that time whether these issues were real issues or not real issues 2 because we had not seen the source code for their product. 3 Your Honor said that one of the things that the 4 5 court-appointed expert should undertake is to consider certain factual issues looking at that source code so that we 6 could tell whether these were issues that we're working on --7 8 THE COURT: Or just abstract definitional things. All right, so thank you very much. I have another case I 9 10 think at 4:00? Is that what time? 11 THE CLERK: No, 3:30. THE COURT: 12 We're busy this afternoon. All right, so why don't we just hear from you. 13 I'm obviously 14 concerned. 15 I understand, your Honor. Let me try MR. COHEN: 16 to explain where we agree and where we disagree to get rid of some underbrush. The test, as Mr. Frank says, is to try to 17 18 determine whether Goodwin Procter ended up in an 19 attorney-client relationship with VST as a result of these preliminary meetings. One step below that ultimate question, 20 however, I think there are two really large disagreements 21 22 about the analytical structure for figuring this out, and let 23 me try briefly to do those and then say just a few words about the facts, because I may not be able to solve your 24 25 factual questions, given what you said to Mr. Frank.

First, the VST papers and Mr. Frank today ignore 1 what may be the largest single fact in the situation, or more 2 3 than a fact, maybe a lens through which one should appropriately look at the two meetings and accompanying 4 E-mails that Mr. Frank has described, and that is that unlike 5 the situation in Bays and unlike the situation in Mailer 6 V. Mailer, Norman Mailer's divorce from his third of many 7 8 wives, which were the two leading --9 THE COURT: Is that what the Mailer is? 10 MR. COHEN: It is. Monroe Inker talked to Mrs. Mailer number three and then ended up representing 11 Norman Mailer, and that's what led to that dispute. 12 are the two leading SJC cases that we've got on the table. 13 14 In those cases, we have individuals, relatively unsophisticated individuals calling a lawyer, briefly, 15 16 preliminary discussions. The question is whether the 17 discussions went far enough to establish an attorney-client relationship. 18 19 Here we have a sophisticated high-tech company with, I think, in-house counsel, but, in any event, Choate 20 21 Hall representing it already on other matters, explicitly saying, presumably to Mr. Frank as well as to Mr. Ware, 22 "We're trying to choose counsel. We want to interview you 23 in order to decide whether to hire you or not." That doesn't 24

mean that there cannot have been too much interaction and

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hence an attorney-client relationship established. 1 trying to say there's a legal safe harbor there, but I am 2 trying to say this is a highly relevant factor because many 3 of the cases that talk about figuring out whether preliminary 4 5 discussions led to an attorney-client relationship phrase the question in terms of, was there a reasonable expectation, a 6 reasonable belief on VST's part in this situation, that 7 8 Goodwin Procter in this situation had become its lawyer? 9 Usually in these cases the fight is whether there was such a belief, and the fight is whether it was reasonable or not, 10 11 given the circumstances. 12 Here I suggest to you that if we do look backwards 13 at where the players' heads were a year and a half ago, VST would have told you, or us or Choate Hall or anyone else, 14 that they had not yet hired Goodwin Procter, they were trying 15 to decide whether to hire Goodwin Procter; and that far from 16 17 the question about reasonable belief or not that Goodwin was 18 already its lawyer, I don't think there was any belief at all 19 that Goodwin was its lawyer. They were interviewing Goodwin and trying to figure out, how will you go if hired? 20 21 THE COURT: The word "privileged, 22 confidential," all those. The question is, here it's not 23 black and white. It's gray here. 24 MR. COLEMAN: It is not at all black and white.

THE COURT: And why doesn't Goodwin Procter -- it's

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a sophisticated firm, this must happen all the time -- send a letter to people saying, "Don't send us stuff. I'm not your lawyer until --" I mean, this shouldn't have happened.

MR. COHEN: It should not have happened. This is a

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problem in significant part of our own making, and that isn't dispositive all by itself either, but it's clearly a factor. This is complicated. And what I want to tell you second about the place at which Choate Hall and we disagree about the analytical structure is that this is not a sort of an off switch/on switch: If you find X, then you're disqualified. If you don't find X, then you're still in the game. The analysis at the SJC is in a very fundamental way, which I'll spend two minutes on, if I may, fuzzier than that. And where it leaves the trial court judge, it seems to me, is free to exercise judgment in following what -- you said you're familiar with the Bays case. My take on that and the Mailer case is not so much about the stated standard but about where are we when the dust settles? Despite all the discussion of confidential information and legal advice given, where are we at the end of those cases?

And, by the way, confidential information is again a factor in determining attorney-client privilege. It is not itself a dispositive "Sorry, you're gone, you have to leave the courtroom" issue. It is one of the major factors, again, in determining whether an attorney-client relationship came

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The interesting thing about Bays, which took me a second reading to see, is that while they were affirming a trial court's decision to say, you know, there was confidential information, in fact there it was concrete in a way, to answer one of your other questions that I'll get to in a minute. You can see without waiving the privilege really what was being discussed. There was confidential information about the way in which the common area calculations in this condo were calculated, full information given, according to the SJC's report of the trial judge, and some legal advice about that. So we have both confidential information and we have a legal advice given. And while they affirm what the trial court did, what the trial court did was in the first order say, "Sorry, you're disqualified," and in a second order say, "You know, we're not going to kick you out of the case after all. We're going to let you keep representing the other side, the new client, except where that confidential information gives you a real advantage." They bifurcated the trial and said, "You can't try it on the 93A trial, but you can on the other."

THE COURT: As a practical matter, your client has been beating down my door -- well, ScanSoft, Mr. Bromberg's, "Hurry up, hurry up, hurry up, get this going," pressure, pressure, all right? "There are trade secrets.

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They're killing our company." As a practical matter, it's either going to take me a few months to write up this mess, or I'm going to refer it to a master to make fact findings. And while this is happening, I can't have your firm involved. MR. COHEN: That may be right, and then the client. if you come out there at the end of this discussion, then the client will have to decide if they want us to pursue this in front of the magistrate or not. I understand that will be an issue that --THE COURT: But in the meantime, the case is going to move forward, and I would enjoin your participation in it. So I've got a problem because the words "privileged" were used, the words "confidential, I'll keep your confidentiality" were involved. There's an allegation that they were seeking legal advice from Goodwin before Goodwin was even hired, and that in exchange, prior art was investigated. I mean, this is not a slam-dunk for you. It is not at all a slam-dunk, although MR. COHEN: the cases also have resolved issues without resolving -- that is, there are other ways than referring this to a master. And maybe you'll decide at the end that that's what you have to do. I do not say this is a trivial issue. I understand there are some disputes of fact, but, for example, in the

Mailer case, the ex-wife, about to be ex-wife, says that she

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told Monroe Inker a whole lot of stuff about their intimate relationship and the grounds for divorce, and he denied that. and the trial judge said, "No, it's just implausible." And to some extent, if you don't want to go there, obviously --THE COURT: I don't buy it. I know Mr. Downs and Mr. Ware. I've had many patent cases. It's not implausible that they were trying to be as helpful as possible so that they'd get the business, and they're fabulous lawyers, it's not implausible. It's not like telling your sexual intimate details. I mean, of course they're going to try and help. Yes, but at the level of -- a patent MR. COHEN: case is not the same as, how do you calculate the common area percentages in a condo? If you imagine two meetings of approximately an hour each and all these topics being discussed, I don't think it's plausible that Goodwin could have gone beyond saying "No claim construction. seen the patent file. We haven't seen whatever -- " There's no allegation that whatever prior art VST had already thought about was ever actually given as opposed to talked about. seems implausible that they could have given legal advice, "This is the answer," as opposed to, "Here's what we'll explore if you hire us."

And the problem with this level of generality, which you referred to already, "How do I decide?" it seems to

me that where they have some ultimate burden to show that we should be disqualified here to overcome the right of an entity to choose counsel on its own, that what happened in those other cases? Without giving away the privileged information, there were ways to talk about the information disclosed that made it clear to the courts there, as opposed, I suggest, to the affidavits here that say, for instance, "We talked about our products including future products." Well, it's a year and a half later. And time, by the way, is the factor in the cases before. Things get stale. They may be confidential but now public. They may be confidential but obviously to be discovered in plain view in discovery in this case once there's litigation.

It's easy enough to say there was discussion of our products, but that doesn't really convey any real likelihood that there is something secret about the products that isn't known from the kind of case, the kind of patent it is, the kind of --

THE COURT: But that's where it's impossible for me to decide because it's not that it's so implausible; it's just that if they disclose the level of detail you want, A, if I keep you in the case, that they've now refreshed their recollection, and to boot, I'll find out, and it could be something that is or isn't relevant to some decision I make which may be prejudicial to them. I don't know. So that's

why I'm probably not the best fact-finder here.

MR. COHEN: Well, I wanted to disclose the E-mails as well. And when we thought about it for a minute, because we think in the end that they will show that there is not enough here, but we thought about it and said, wait, since it's unclear yet, unresolved yet whether we did establish an attorney-client relationship, we felt we could not give you the E-mails. And Mr. Frank is, I think, right about where we are on the E-mails. I would think that the E-mails and the other evidence are something that a magistrate judge or another finder of fact or somebody could decide to look at easily --

THE COURT: Who's the magistrate judge on this, Judge Alexander?

MR. COHEN: -- could look at quite quickly, if you wanted to go that way. And that would help give a sense of, is this really legal advice, or is this raising issues to be thought about --

THE COURT: Well, I will tell you, they've raised a prima facie case for disqualification, just based on the word "privilege" being used, "confidential," the allegation that Mr. Downs did research and came up with some prior art, discussion of settlement, et cetera. Whether it proves up, I don't know, but I certainly can't leave you in the case while this is out there. Now, so I can either -- and maybe what

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would make some sense is to go back and talk to your client
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     about what should happen here. I have three choices. One, I
     could get all these E-mails and, based on the current record,
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     just make a decision. Two, I could refer it to
     Judge Alexander for fact-finding and enjoin participation for
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     Goodwin Procter while -- so the rest of the case essentially
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     can move on. I mean, I guess the third option would be some
     sort of pragmatic, yes, Mr. Kline could do it but not the
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     attorneys involved, but it sounds as if that that's not
     something that Mr. Frank is interested in. So I suggest you
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     just have some heartfelt discussions with your client.
               But in the interim, this is what I'm going to do:
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     I am going to take this under advisement.
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                                                I will either
     refer it to a magistrate judge or issue an opinion on the
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              I'll think about that. But in the meantime, Goodwin
     Procter shouldn't be involved. Bromberg should be involved
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     as it has been all along. I assume they're still counsel,
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     right?
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                          They are, your Honor, that's correct.
               MR. COHEN:
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               THE COURT:
                          And you need to be getting me stuff,
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     right?
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               MR. FRANK:
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                           And so how far along is that master's
               THE COURT:
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     issue?
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               MR. FRANK:
                           We have exchanged proposed procedures,
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himself available.

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and I think it would be fair to say that they're quite
divergent. We need to serve them up to you, I respectfully
suggest, along with a short explanation by each of us as to
why we think, each of us thinks its version is consistent
with your prior orders and otherwise appropriate. For our
part, we can certainly do that by the end of this week, and I
assume that you can as well.
          MR. BELT: We can.
          MS. FLEMING: Yes.
          THE COURT: So my proposal with respect to that, if
your Honor will permit it, is that by close of business on
Friday, we submit to you both our respective proposals with
respect to a court-appointed master procedures.
          THE COURT: Does that sound okay?
          MR. BELT: Yes.
          MS. FLEMING: In addition, your Honor, we did
submit a joint letter to the Court recommending the
appointment of Professor Hermann Ney.
          THE COURT: Where's he from?
          MS. FLEMING: He's in Germany, your Honor.
          THE COURT: Oh, yes, the German. So he's going to
fly in here?
          MS. FLEMING: He has represented that he will make
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THE COURT: The closest you could find a guy

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     without a conflict was Germany?
               MS. FLEMING: That's right, your Honor, and we
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     worked at this for a long time.
               MR. BELT: He speaks very good English.
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               THE COURT: I hope so because, remember, he's got
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     to teach me what this is all about.
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               MR. FRANK: Yes, he does, and he understands that
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     that's part of the role. May I have two sentences?
               THE COURT: Yes, and then I have a criminal
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     pretrial.
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               MR. FRANK: The core question here is or the core
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12
     consideration is that there is no prejudice whatever to
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     ScanSoft if Bromberg & Sunstein, which is very good,
     continues to represent them. There is substantial potential
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     prejudice to VoiceSignal if people at Goodwin Procter were in
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16
     the position where they were receiving confidential
     information. And there's no dispute but that Goodwin Procter
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     encouraged the submission of information. I read to you part
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     of that E-mail. No dispute that they marked their E-mails
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     "privileged," and no dispute that in the cases we're talking
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21
     about, Bays and Mailer, the client was overtly seeking --
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               THE COURT: Yes, could you submit those E-mails to
     me and delete out anything you think I shouldn't see; I mean,
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     just the stuff you read?
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               MR. FRANK: Certainly. Oh, you'll have them
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1 tomorrow.

THE COURT: Does that make sense?

MR. COHEN: It does, your Honor, and I would suggest that we should probably write to the Court within the next few days after consulting with our client about whether a reference to Magistrate Alexander would be appropriate or whether, gee, given the time that would take, the client is going to change its mind or not.

THE COURT: Yes, I think that makes a lot of sense.

MR. COHEN: I do too. I do think we should not forget that -- you've quoted this before -- that I think
Mr. Frank is turning the burden on its head to say, gee,
there will be no prejudice to the client if it doesn't use
Goodwin Procter. We start with the premise that the client,
unless there's disqualification grounds shown, is entitled to
the counsel of its choice.

THE COURT: My point is that they've clearly made enough of a case to have me take this seriously, so I'm going to either sit myself and look through the E-mails and the affidavits -- and I hate doing that because I know how scripted both sides can be on the affidavits -- or just have somebody here, live bodies. Now, it could be me, but that would take a really long time because I'm starting a big trial in January.

MR. COHEN: We'd rather have the magistrate do it

in the interest of time. And the E-mails of course are not scripted because on both sides they were done without this in mind.

THE COURT: Right. And the bottom line is, the other concern about me doing it is that there may be things that should come out which you don't want me to hear that may affect my judgment of the case, willfulness, inequitable conduct, all those kinds of things that you just might not want me to hear. And so I think it does make some sense to have a report and recommendation, but I think it will take a while. It's Christmastime, and I just can't see holding up this whole suit when both sides have been banging down my door on it. I sort of wondered why I wasn't hearing from anyone.

MR. COHEN: Well, we're not suggesting that you wait, and we'll try to move as rapidly as we can in front of the magistrate if the client still wants us to do that.

THE COURT: Right. And I think, you know, two great firms in the city, on balance, there may be a more practical solution to all of this, so I look forward to hearing from you in a few days.

MR. COHEN: Thank you, your Honor.

(Adjourned, 3:55 p.m.)

1	<u>CERTIFICATE</u>
2	
3	INITED CONTROL DISCOURT (CONTROL)
4	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT) DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS) ss.
5	CITY OF BOSTON)
6	
7	
8	I, Lee A. Marzilli, Official Federal Court
9	Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript,
10	Pages 1 through 28 inclusive, was recorded by me
11	stenographically at the time and place aforesaid in Civil
12	Action No. 04-10353-PBS, ScanSoft, Inc. V. VoiceSignal
13	Technologies, Inc., et al, and thereafter by me reduced to
14	typewriting and is a true and accurate record of the
15	proceedings.
16	In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand this
17	18th day of December, 2005.
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19	
20	
21	
22	
23	De a Martile
24	LEÉ Á. MARZILLI, ÓRR OFFICIAL FEDERAL COURT REPORTER
25	